Inserting professionals and professional organizations in studies of wrongdoing: The nature, antecedents and consequences of professional misconduct by Gabbioneta C et al.
 
 
Inserting professionals and professional organizations in studies of wrongdoing: The 
nature, antecedents, and consequences of professional misconduct 
Claudia Gabbioneta, James R Faulconbridge, Graeme Currie, Ronit Dinovitzer and Daniel 
Muzio  
 
Abstract 
Professional misconduct has become seemingly ubiquitous in recent decades. However, to date 
there has been little sustained effort to theorize the phenomenon of professional misconduct, how 
this relates to professional organizations, and how this may contribute to broader patterns of 
corruption and wrongdoing. In response to this gap, in this contribution we discuss the theoretical 
and empirical implications of analyses that focus on the nature, antecedents and consequences of 
professional misconduct. In particular, we discuss how the nature of professional misconduct can 
be quite variegated and nuanced, how boundaries between and within professions can be either too 
weak or too strong and lead to professional misconduct, and how the consequence of professional 
misconduct can be less straightforward than normally assumed. We also illuminate how some 
important questions about professional misconduct are still pending, including: how we define its 
different organizational forms; how it is instigated by the changing nature of professional 
boundaries; and how its consequences are responded to in professional organizations and society 
more widely.  
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Introduction 
At the end of 2015, the hidden wealth of some of the world’s most prominent leaders, politicians 
and celebrities was revealed by an unprecedented leak of millions of documents that show how 
rich individuals can exploit secretive offshore tax regimes. These documents – commonly referred 
to as the ‘Panama Papers’ – provide evidence that a number of law firms, tax advisors, and 
corporate service providers helped wealthy individuals to avoid paying taxes by moving their 
money from their home countries to off-shore locations. They also reveal the shocking scale of 
this professionally orchestrated tax avoidance, with around 214,000 companies and 14,000 
individuals named in the ‘Panama Papers’.  
Unfortunately, misdeeds such as those exposed in the ‘Panama Papers’ are not isolated 
cases. The media are now full of accounts of professionals and professional services firms 
engaging in unethical, if not illegal, activities. These cases have fuelled a growing interest in 
professional misconduct, as testified by the increase in the number of studies on the topic published 
in the last few years. However, to date there has been little sustained effort to theorize the 
phenomenon of professional misconduct, its relationship to organizations, and how this may 
contribute to broader patterns of corruption and wrongdoing (but see Muzio et al., 2016 for an 
exception). 
This is a significant omission in our knowledge both empirically and theoretically. 
Empirically, because to paraphrase Mitchell and Sikka (2011: 8), if you scratch the surface of any 
major case of corporate wrongdoing, you will find the invisible hands of several professional 
occupations and organizations. Most cases of corporate wrongdoing could have not occurred 
without the acquiescence if not the active involvement of a range of professional advisers and 
 
 
organizations. Understanding how and why professionals get involved, therefore, may help to 
curb, if not to prevent, corporate wrongdoing. In the same way, in a different but equally important 
professional context – that of healthcare – professional misconduct is often associated with the 
provision of poor services and treatments and, as such, needs to be better understood and theorized 
if we want to improve the quality of the services offered. Theoretically, the phenomenon of 
professional misconduct represents a challenge to traditional understandings of professionalism as 
a distinct occupational principle (Freidson, 2001), to the governance of professional services firms 
(Sherer & Leblebici, 2015), and more broadly to established approaches to risk management and 
economic regulation (Coffee, 2006).  
In particular, dominant functionalist understandings of the professions are predicated on 
the notion that these are distinguished from regular businesses and trades by their superior moral 
fibre (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933; Durkheim, 1957; Parsons, 1954). It is their commitment to 
quality and public service which underscores a regulative bargain (Cooper et al., 1988) whereby 
professions are granted labour market privileges like monopolies, restricted practices and self-
regulation which would not be tolerated in other sectors of the economy. Similarly, in terms of 
corporate governance (Mintzberg, 1979; Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Sherer & Leblebici, 2015; 
Muzio et al., 2016) professional organizations are characterised by high levels of trust and 
collegiality, responsible autonomy and informal peer control mechanisms. The idea being that 
quality and integrity depends on the socialization of staff through the professional qualification 
system rather than on internal controls or any other form of procedural regulation. Finally, for the 
above reasons, the professions have been assigned a quasi-regulatory role in the broader political 
economy. For Brint (1994) professions are social trustees to essential skills and competences 
which they administer for the benefit of society as whole, whilst for Coffee (2006) they are 
 
 
‘gatekeepers’ which guarantee the integrity of key societal institutions such as the delivery of 
healthcare, the administration of justice and the operation of financial markets.  
In this context, recent and historical cases of professional misconduct have severely 
challenged the view of the professions as inherently good and altruistic, as well as the governance 
and regulatory frameworks which are predicated on this understanding. High level cases of 
corporate corruption such as Enron and Parmalat revealed how these were facilitated and sustained 
by extensive professional networks including auditors, accountants, lawyers, credit/security 
analysts and management consultants, usually employed in large professional organizations 
(Coffee, 2005; 2006; Gabbioneta et al., 2013; 2014; Muzio et al., 2016). Similarly, professional 
misconduct occurs in healthcare settings as well – witness high level inquiries regarding attacks 
upon children by a nurse (Brown, 2000) and poor quality care for older persons (Francis, 2013) 
within UK hospitals. The case of high infant mortality, the cover up of a quality problem following 
heart surgery (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003), and the recent case of child abuse in the UK health care 
system (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011), tragically highlight the gap between the taken-for-granted 
view of doctors as the embodiment of ethical and altruistic values and the reality of professional 
misconduct. Of course, we should not exclude our own practices and priorities as academics from 
examination, given the number of high profile cases of academic misconduct which have recently 
been reported (Honig et al., 2014).            
These cases of professional misconduct raise some interesting questions, such as: ‘How 
can we better understand and theorize misconduct by professionals and professional 
organizations?’ ‘To what extent does this depart from other forms of misconduct?’ ‘How and under 
what circumstances are professionals more likely to engage in misconduct?’ And, ‘what are its 
consequences, including its impact on existing governance and regulatory frameworks?’ 
 
 
Answering these questions is important for a range of debates. First, it may contribute to 
the literature on professions as it helps to understand why professional misconduct persists in spite 
of increasing regulation and efforts by professional associations and organizations, and how this 
problem could be addressed. Second, it makes an important contribution to the broader literature 
on organizational wrongdoing as it focuses our attention on how professionals and professional 
organizations may enable, and even encourage, wrongdoing in both private and public sector 
organizations. By doing that, it may help us to develop more holistic governance and regulatory 
frameworks to better manage, and possibly prevent, the risks associated with organizational 
wrongdoing. Finally, it may help to bring together debates across a number of specialist literatures, 
such as law, business ethics, accountancy, healthcare, and finance where cases of professional 
misconduct are located but organizational considerations often under-emphasized. 
In this contribution, we draw attention to some of the key theoretical and empirical insights 
emerging from research that has analysed professional misconduct and that has paved the way for 
future research in this area. Although illustrative rather than exhaustive, we believe that our initial 
selection of empirical and conceptual studies on professional misconduct allows us to develop a 
more advanced understanding of this phenomenon.  
 
Emerging theoretical and empirical insights from research on professional misconduct 
In this section we discuss emerging theoretical and empirical insights within research on 
professional misconduct grouping them into three broader areas of investigation: insights on the 
nature of professional misconduct, insights on the antecedents of professional misconduct, and 
insights on the consequences of professional misconduct. Then, building on these insights, we 
suggest some possible directions for future research.   
 
 
 
The nature of professional misconduct 
A research agenda on professional misconduct should recognise misconduct itself is a 
heterogeneous phenomenon. A view of misconduct as a continuum of instances that range from 
actions that are illegal (prohibited by criminal and civil laws) to actions that are unprofessional 
(against professional codes of conduct and protocols) or unethical (contrary to societal norms and 
expectations) or opens up the possibility of theorising the different factors at play in a range of 
examples of misconduct.  
The functionalist perspective offers some insight into the nature of professional 
misconduct, as it entails conceptions of professionalism that emphasise a sense of internalised 
moral responsibility that transcends individual or organizational self-interest and shows itself in a 
sentiment of care for the client and society at large (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933; Parsons, 
1954). From this viewpoint, professions have a normative value that comes from the role they 
exercise for the benefit of society. As such, their members are duty-bound and constrained by 
occupational rather than organizational loyalty from engaging in unethical or illegal acts. From 
this lens, professional misconduct encompasses actions that deviate from the benefit they are 
supposed to provide for the client and society at large.  
The studies reported in this special issue illustrate the complex nature of professional 
misconduct. Harrington (XXXX; this issue) shows how misconduct manifests at the institutional 
level when “practitioners acquire the moral justification necessary to perpetuate misconduct” 
(Harrington: 32). Professionals re-categorise tax avoidance so that it does not now constitute 
professional misconduct but a sensible and entirely rational corporate practice. This case can be 
defined as professional misconduct since it appears to counter wider public interest, and hence 
 
 
undermines the normative basis of professionalism.  Further examples of this type of misconduct 
are also found in a healthcare context. For instance, the prescription of ‘branded’ rather than 
‘generic’ medicines in exchange for financial rewards by pharmaceutical companies (Singh & 
Jayanti, 2013) is an example of a behaviour that, while not violating the law, runs counter to the 
expectation that healthcare professionals should act in their patients’ rather than in their own best 
interest. Another case from the private sector (Kershaw & Moorhead, 2013: 51) exemplifies how 
professional services firms crossed jurisdiction to find more favourable regulations to support their 
clients’ activities. In this specific case global law firm Linklaters drew on English rather than USA 
law to provide a favourable assessment of the Lehman Brothers’ plans to remove liabilities from 
its balance sheet through a particular accounting transaction (Repo 105); this ultimately played a 
very important role in its bankruptcy and in the broader financial crisis. In these cases, 
professionals are not acting illegally but may be acting unethically as they are not considering how 
technically and legally sound advice may have unintended consequences and raise undue risks. 
This clearly runs counter to public interest or social trusteeship understandings of professionalism.  
To emphasise our point, professional misconduct needs to be understood in its context. As 
Roulet (XXXX; this issue) highlight in their study of media accounts of misconduct in the banking 
industry, professional misconduct can be defined or not by the alignment of professional’s actions 
with accepted norms. Similar to Harrington, professional misconduct may not be regarded as such 
by professionals where it has been re-categorised as legitimate behaviour. Nevertheless, others 
may view it differently. Hence we need to ask the question, ‘from whose perspective do we define 
professional misconduct?’  
Professional misconduct can also be judged by its divergence from what is formally 
required by governance structures and processes. Even when operating within legal or regulatory 
 
 
boundaries, professional misconduct can be derived from a violation of professional codes of 
conduct. Examples of this type of behaviour in a healthcare setting is poor care for patients, of the 
kind practiced at Mid-Staffordshire Hospital where some patients were left unwashed for up to a 
month, or pain relief was delivered late, even as the regulatory body assessed the quality of care 
as acceptable (Francis, 2013). In the case of Enron, the failure of lawyers to elevate issues beyond 
the manager with whom they were working to more senior officers of the corporation is a stark 
example of the ways in which the lack of compliance with professional codes of conduct can lead 
to serious consequences. These examples highlight the importance of examining whether 
professional misconduct is only defined against formal governance or regulatory demands. As 
evident in the studies within this special issue, the answer is ‘no’. Professional misconduct can be 
defined at an institutional level, organizational level or individual behavioural level, which reflects 
the ‘bad cellars, bad barrels, or bad apples” hypotheses (see below, and Muzio et al., 2016), even 
where formal governance or regulatory demands have not been transgressed. 
In considering what represents professional misconduct, we might turn the question around 
to ask, ‘what represents professional conduct?’ A number of studies in this special issue encourage 
us to re-invigorate notions and definitions of professional conduct, which are widespread and all 
pervasive, as well as professional misconduct, which, arguably, while increasingly reported in the 
media, represent a more isolated phenomenon. 
Radaelli and colleagues (XXXX; this issue) cause us to further broaden the definition of 
professional misconduct. Their study highlights how professionals, specifically university 
academics and managers, are captured by outside interests, namely organized crime. As a result, 
unsuitable doctors are not just trained, but also placed in the public healthcare system. This draws 
our attention to the need for a contextualised understanding of professional misconduct and its 
 
 
features, such as autonomy and social trusteeship in specific settings, which give rise to 
professional misconduct. As a final question, we thus need to interrogate variance across settings 
and ask, ‘what represents professional misconduct in any specific context?’ 
 
The antecedents of professional misconduct 
Those studies that have investigated the antecedents of professional misconduct have 
traditionally adopted either a ‘bad apple’ or a ‘bad barrel’ perspective to the study of misconduct. 
The ‘bad apple’ hypothesis conceives of professional misconduct as the result of the actions of 
rogue individuals, who act in their own personal interest at the expense of their employers, clients 
or patients (see, for example, Abdolmohammadi et al., 2003; Lord & DeZoort, 2001; Patterson, 
2001). The obvious example of a bad apple is that of Harold Shipman – a British doctor who killed 
over 200 of his patients before his arrest in 1998 and that, according to the commission which 
investigated his case, was “addicted to killing” – or of any other professional who harms their 
patients/clients in the pursuit of their own interests. The ‘bad barrel’ hypothesis provides a very 
different understanding of professional misconduct. According to this perspective, professional 
misconduct originates from more systemic causes including dysfunctional cultures, practices and 
structures. A clear example is misaligned incentive systems in organizations (Coffee, 2005; 
Covaleski et al., 1998; Grey, 2003) which reward undue risk taking and lessen fiduciary 
obligations. Similarly, the development of strong corporate cultures predicated on mythologies of 
excellence, success and prestige generate processes of ‘structural assurance’ (Grey 2003; Wilson 
et al., 2008; Smets et al., 2012) whereby individual practitioners become detached from broader 
deontological frameworks and come to believe in the infallibility of their organizations. As cases 
such as Enron and the Panama Papers debacle indicate, this can result in the prioritizing of 
 
 
commercial objectives such as revenue growth and profitability at the expense of broader concerns 
with public service and social trusteeship and are, therefore, likely to facilitate cases of 
wrongdoing.  
More recently, however, drawing upon the sociology of boundaries (Lamont & Molnár, 
2002; Abbott, 1995) and on Abbott’s (2005) linked ecologies perspective, a third hypothesis 
(Muzio et al., 2016) has emerged that connects professional misconduct with the design and 
management of set of boundaries separating different communities and their respective interests. 
This perspective considers three set of boundaries as being particularly important. These include 
jurisdictional boundaries separating different occupational communities such as lawyers and 
accountants; geo-political boundaries, separating different national and regional contexts; and 
ecological boundaries separating professionals from a range of stakeholders such as clients, 
employers and increasingly investors. The design and management of these boundaries may 
precipitate the possibility of professionals becoming, wittingly or unwittingly, involved in cases 
of wrongdoing in a number of ways. There are, however, two important conceptual challenges in 
relation to theorising professional misconduct from a boundaries perspective.  
First, as Lamont and Molnár (2002: 169) highlight, boundaries can be understood in 
symbolic and social terms. The latter understanding has dominated in work on the professions. 
Social boundaries are conceptualised as a means of resource differentiation, with inclusion and 
exclusion being the key mechanisms for controlling resources. Like much of the work on the 
sociology of the professions, work on social boundaries is informed by neo-Weberian perspectives 
– as best captured by work on occupational closure (Larson, 1977; Parkin, 1979; Murphy, 1984). 
In terms of professional misconduct, this has resulted in a focus on whether the increasingly 
multidisciplinary and multinational nature of professional expertise results in social boundaries 
 
 
being weakened, revealed as too strong, or ambiguous. For example, Gabbioneta et al. (2014) show 
that boundaries between accountants, law firms and credit rating agencies are often too strong, as 
despite their interdependency and interaction, they fail to scrutinise each-others’ judgements 
because of their closed jurisdictional realms. This was partly implicated in the misconduct 
associated with the demise of Parmalat. Conversely, when boundaries are too weak they fail to 
keep different groups apart. Crotty (2009) illustrates this with the example of investment bankers 
and credit rating agencies, the latter being paid by the former to rate their products and thus blurring 
the boundary between the two groups and compromising the fiduciary role of rating agencies. 
Boundaries are too ambiguous when they create liminal spaces in which there is uncertainty with 
regards to applicable rule and standards and in which possibilities for intentional arbitrage emerge, 
as evidence by cases of tax evasion (Sikka & Hampton, 2005). It is, then, important to further 
interrogate how social boundaries influence the nature, antecedents and consequences of 
professional misconduct. However, a focus on social boundaries, as the predominant 
preoccupation of existing literatures, is insufficient and in need of further extension.  
A focus on social boundaries underestimates the growing significance of symbolic 
boundaries in professional misconduct. Symbolic boundaries take the form of categorisations that 
are struggled over, that evolve, and that produce distinctions. They are different from social 
boundaries in that they are not associated with mechanisms of formalised control which 
institutionalize resource inequalities, such as closure in the case of the professions. For example, 
in the professions there are important symbolic boundaries between elite and non-elite firms 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) or within and across professional services firms with regards to 
how individual professionals understand and enact their roles (Singh & Jayanti, 2013; Morehead 
et al., 2016).  
 
 
For questions of professional misconduct, the role of symbolic boundaries matters because 
of the way they can prevent or enable misconduct, and even create contradictions when compared 
to what social boundaries prescribe, prevent or enable. For example, Singh and Jayanti (2013) 
describe how in the pharmaceutical profession important symbolic boundaries exist between the 
‘closer’ and ‘consultant’ roles of professionals when they are employed in commercial drug 
organisations such as Pfizer. The former role relates to the closing of deals for drugs sales, the 
latter to acting as an advisor to patients and serving their best interests. Singh and Jayanti (2013) 
document the way that these symbolic boundaries were compromised at Pfizer, and as a result 
drugs were prescribed inappropriately. Similarly, Moorhead and Cahill-O’Callaghan (2016) reveal 
that the ecological boundary between professionals and clients is, in the case of in-house lawyers, 
very much a symbolic boundary. In-house lawyers need to draw on symbolic distinctions between 
what they are required to do in their role as advisors to their employers and what they are required 
to do in their role of professionals with fiduciary responsibilities. This requires a ‘moral compass’ 
(Moorhead et al., 2016) which can be disorientated by the weakening of these symbolic boundaries 
and in turn may lead to misconduct.  
 There are, then, a series of important questions about the types of boundaries that propagate 
or prevent professional misconduct. ‘What factors render social and symbolic boundaries more or 
less important, interdependent and effective or ineffective in professional misconduct?’ ‘Are there 
new symbolic boundaries that need to be taken account of and why?’ Multiple papers in the special 
issue develop our understanding of these issues.        
 A particularly strong theme in the special issue papers is that of symbolic boundary 
weakening. Both Harrington (XXXX; this issue) and Roulet (XXXX; this issue) provide examples 
of how the symbolic boundary between professional and client is increasingly dissolved and the 
 
 
logics of the two groups fused. For Harrington this relates to the category editing process, a process 
through which the definition of ‘wealth management professional’ (the category in question) is 
revised (edited) by members of the professions to justify their behaviour, whilst for Roulet this 
relates to a co-produced understanding of professional logics. Harrington also reveals how the 
weakening of symbolic boundaries is interdependent with the transgression of social boundaries. 
The wealth management professionals she studies enable misconduct because of the way category 
editing justifies arbitrage and the crossing of different professional and regulatory boundaries in 
pursuit of tax minimisation benefits. The paper by Lander et al. (XXXX; this issue) highlights 
instead the importance of considering symbolic boundaries previously underestimated in terms of 
their significance for misconduct. They show that the symbolic boundaries between junior and 
senior, tenured and untenured professionals play important roles in determining who commits 
misconduct and why. Their work also engages with governance practices that encourage or 
discourage boundaries within an organization. Specifically, they find that informal governance, 
which relies on informal and peer control practices in fact increases misconduct.  
Together, then, the papers in the special issue reveal the importance of further questioning 
the nature, dynamics and interactions of different social and symbolic boundaries. In particular, 
they show that there is a need to move beyond the much debated professional versus commercial 
logics that are often seen as key symbolic boundaries associated with misconduct. Such boundaries 
persist and matter, but are no more important than other symbolic boundaries that both encompass 
the professional/commercial divide (e.g. the professional/client boundary) but also transcend it and 
introduce new concerns (e.g. junior/senior and professional/non-professional boundaries). 
A second conceptual challenge arises from the increasingly complex role and relationships 
of professions in the twenty-first century. In outlining the ‘linked ecologies’ between different 
 
 
professions, as well as between professions and other groups, Abbott (2005) focuses on ‘ligations’ 
– relationships connecting different actors and sites. These ‘ligations’ result from the way 
professions compete over jurisdictions, but also cooperate in ‘linked ecologies’ as complex 
problems – ranging from cross-border corporate financing to low human fertility – bring the same 
professions from different countries, previously unconnected professions, and professions and 
other actors (banks, regulators etc.) into interaction and interdependency.  
The importance in contemporary professional work of ‘linked ecologies’ and ‘ligations’ 
creates epistemological challenges in the study of boundaries. Studies have predominantly adopted 
what Lamont and Molnár (2002: 171, original emphasis) describe as “content and interpretative 
dimensions”. Such an approach emphasizes how boundaries are accomplished through specific 
claims and interpretations. For the professions this usually relates to the claims of expertise made 
to justify closure. Whilst content and interpretative approaches are useful, the growing significance 
of ‘ligations’ calls for a focus on what Lamont and Molnár (2002: 171) describe as the “intra-
individual processes” – i.e. the relationships of those operating within and seeking to define, 
challenge, reproduce or maintain boundaries as part of interactions with other actors. Liu (2018: 
1) applies such thinking specifically to the professions and calls for a “processual theory of action 
that examines the interactions among professionals and other actors over, within, and across 
boundaries”. Such an approach is needed because ‘ligations’ mean professionals are “not lone 
rangers working in their protected territories. They are embedded in complex social networks and 
their actions always involve exchange with other social actors” (Liu, 2018: 8). 
In terms of professional misconduct, a focus on ‘intra-individual processes’ demands that 
we consider the way a multitude of relationships within, between and outside of professional 
groupings potentially challenge, reproduce, or create new boundaries that propagate or prevent 
 
 
misconduct. For example, Radcliffe et al. (2018: 46) analyse the way that tax professionals 
responded to the complexity of providing transnational corporate tax advice and conclude that 
relationships between different groups of tax professionals (e.g. in-house, external advisors, etc.) 
as well as across borders leads to the redefinition of the category of tax professional and associated 
rules of the game. This allows the negotiation of a new interpretation of what is moral behaviour, 
in ways that heighten the likelihood of the kinds of misconduct associated with the Panama Papers 
scandal. However, in order to fully understand the way particular types of relationships between 
professionals and others can be the antecedents for misconduct, the boundaries perspective needs 
a more micro-scale approach than its ecological beginnings have provided. This is central to 
addressing questions such as: ‘Who do professionals interact with, and how do these interactions 
influence the nature, antecedents and consequences of professional misconduct?’ ‘How do 
interactions lead to the renegotiation of existing or production of new boundaries?’ ‘How do 
different professionals with different relationships experience the same boundaries, and what 
explains this differentiation?’ The papers in the special issue provide a number of important 
answers to such questions.  
A clear theme across the articles in this special issue is boundary crossing through ‘intra-
individual processes’. For Radaelli et al. (XXXX; this issue) this relates to the way relationships 
between university professors and the mafia developed that permeated the social boundaries 
designed to protect professionals from pressures that may lead to misconduct. Understanding the 
emergence of such ‘intra-individual processes’, through deviant behaviour as is the case in 
Radaelli et al.’s analysis but also through the wider effects of linked ecologies, is crucial in making 
sense of the mechanisms that generate the potential for misconduct. Indeed, for Roulet (XXXX; 
this issue) a key concern is the intensity of relationships between professionals and other actors 
 
 
such as banks. The compact between these groups results in the dissolving of boundaries noted 
above, and highlights the importance of developing a fully relational analysis in which the 
interactions and interdependencies between professionals, and between professionals and other 
actors, are laid bare and used to understand where risks of misconduct arise. For Lander et al. 
(XXXX; this issue) the boundary between junior and senior professionals is arguably too strong 
in some cases, and contributes to misconduct by discouraging individual interaction and 
communication across the professional hierarchy.  
The special issue papers reveal, then, that there are multiple dynamics in ‘intra-individual 
processes’, including too intense and too weak relational connections that contribute to 
professional misconduct. Moreover, they suggest that in seeking to avoid the limitations of the 
‘bad apple’ approach research should not completely ignore the role of the individual. The focus 
on ‘intra-individual’ processes described here suggests analyses should, therefore, firstly consider 
how individuals respond to, exploit and are captured by their relationships. This implies 
considering both what determines their responses, something which may be informed by ‘bad 
apple’ approaches, but also considering the way the relational topologies (i.e. the array of other 
individuals the subject is drawn into interdependency with) co-constructs responses. I.e., the ‘intra-
individual’ approach suggests ‘bad apples’ do not exist in isolation with only psychological factors 
mattering in explaining misconduct. Second, the ‘intra-individual’ approach also reveals the value 
of mapping relational topologies as part of an extension of ecological approaches to professional 
misconduct. As the complexities of professional practice have increased, for example as ‘ligations’ 
develop between accountants, lawyers, consultants and financiers involved in corporate activities 
tied into international financial markets (Boussebaa and Faulconbridge, 2016, 2018),  the relational 
 
 
topologies of professionals have been altered and rendered more intricate. We do not yet fully 
understand these intricacies and the implications for misconduct. 
   
The consequences and implications of professional misconduct 
While scholars have extensively investigated the consequences of organizational 
misconduct for the organizations involved in it (e.g., Frooman, 1997; Jensen, 2006; Sullivan et al., 
2007) and for ‘by stander’ organizations that are similar to those involved (e.g., Kang, 2008; 
Jonsson et al., 2009; Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015; Piazza & Jourdan, 2018), academic research on 
the consequences of professional misconduct is much more limited. In addition, the few studies 
that have examined the consequences of professional misconduct have yielded mixed results 
(Arnold & Hagan, 1992; Graffin et al., 2013; Assadi & von Nordenflycht, 2018; Palmer et al., 
2018). While in a study of British Members of Parliament (MPs), Graffin et al. (2013) found that 
those MPs that had been involved in misconduct were more likely to experience career 
interruptions than those members that had not, other studies have obtained different results. In their 
analysis of misconduct complaints against lawyers in a Canadian province, Arnold and Hagan 
(1992) provided evidence that sole practitioners were more prone to prosecution than lawyers 
working in law firms because of social conceptions and lay theories about lawyer misconduct, 
perceived threats to the profession’s public image, and the relative powerlessness of these lawyers 
to defend themselves. Similarly, Assadi and von Nordenflycht (2018) found that the negative 
consequences accruing to Wall Street brokers involved in misconduct varied from broker to 
broker, depending on the broker’s tenure and gender, and on whether the misconduct was 
customer- or regulator-initiated. And, in the context of professional road cycling, Palmer et al. 
(2018) documented how only some of the athletes that tested positive to performance enhancing 
 
 
drugs were disqualified, while others were allowed to continue racing. These studies suggest that 
the consequences accruing to those involved in professional misconduct may be less clear-cut than 
originally assumed. Thus we may ask ourselves: ‘Why are the consequences of misconduct more 
severe for some professionals and professional organizations, whilst others seem to suffer much 
milder penalties, or even get away with their misconduct?’ ‘Under what circumstances are 
professionals and professional organizations more likely to suffer the consequences of their 
misconduct?’ And, ‘what role does the context in which misconduct happens play in affecting its 
consequences of misconduct for the professionals involved?’ 
Roulet (XXXX; this issue) provide an answer to some of these questions by showing that 
media exposure of misconduct is not necessarily associated with negative consequences and that, 
quite surprisingly, it may even benefit professionals. In their study of investment banks, they found 
that those banks that had featured more prominently in the media in relation to misconduct were 
more likely to be invited to join IPO syndicates than other banks, ultimately benefitting from ‘bad’ 
publicity. Roulet’s study is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it shows that professional 
norms can be at odds with societal norms, so that behaviours that are perceived as unethical or 
illegal by the general public are acceptable – and even desirable – within a professional context 
and thus have few negative or even positive consequences. Second, it helps to explain why 
professional misconduct may persist despite media scrutiny, although media as ‘social-control 
agents’ (Greve et al., 2010) are supposed to increase the likelihood of sanctions being applied to 
the organizations involved in misconduct. Finally, and importantly, it challenges the taken-for-
granted assumption that other organizations (in this case other banks) will refrain from doing 
business with an organization associated with misconduct because of fears of being tainted by 
association (Anteby, 2010). Future research might build on these important insights and study 
 
 
whether professionals may face different consequences in fields dominated by different logics, and 
whether the negative consequences that professional misconduct brings about in one field may 
perhaps be counter-balanced by positive consequences in another field. Another possibility refers 
to status or reputation and how these affect both the likelihood that organizations and individuals 
may engage in professional misconduct and the consequences of such behaviour. Thus Radaelli et 
al. (XXXX; this issue) suggest how the organization that was targeted for infiltration was chosen 
because its comparatively lower status meant that it was further away from the public gaze and, in 
this case at least, already compromised by relatively lax forms of behaviour. Similarly, Lander et 
al. (XXXX; this issue) show that senior associates working for highly reputed law firms were less 
likely that senior associates working for lower reputed law firms to engage in professional-client 
misconduct, lending additional support to the idea that an organization’s reputation affects the 
likelihood that its members engage in professional misconduct. Future research should continue 
this line of inquiry by investigating how the status and reputation of individual professionals, 
professional organizations, and networks of professional organizations combine in affecting the 
likelihood that professionals and organizations engage in misconduct, as well as how they jointly 
influence its consequences.  
In a related stream of research, some scholars have investigated the implications for 
regulators and policy makers of different instances of professional misconduct and how effective 
their response was in curbing misconduct. The idea behind this type of research is that 
documenting professional misconduct highlights deficiencies in or problems with existing norms 
and regulations which prompts regulators and policy makers to take corrective actions. Early 
research within this line of inquiry (e.g., Dewing & Russell, 2004; Rama & Read, 2006; Early et 
al., 2008; DeFond & Lennox, 2011; Öhman & Wallerstedt, 2012) has provided evidence consistent 
 
 
with the idea that changes in existing norms and regulations in response to professional misconduct 
reduce its future occurrence. Dewing and Russell (2004: 114, emphasis added), for example, 
advocate for a corporate governance regulation in the UK that resembles that of the financial 
industry, as “in the light of empirical evidence and recent events, especially post-Enron, an 
appropriate structure for regulation of corporate governance might better be based on that of 
financial services rather than accounting and audit”. And Rama and Read (2006: 97) show how 
“auditors are much more conservative in the post‐ Enron/SOX period than in the immediately 
preceding period”, suggesting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the ‘SOX’) has helped to curb 
improper behaviours. Later research (e.g., Feldman & Read, 2010; Holm & Zaman, 2012; Knechel 
& Sharma, 2012), however, has cast doubts on this overly optimistic view and explored the 
conditions under which new norms and regulations are more likely to prevent professional 
misconduct. Feldman and Read (2010: 267), for example, provide evidence that auditors’ 
conservatism after the SOX was short-lived, and that it “increases sharply in 2002–2003 compared 
to 2000–2001, it declines in the periods that follow, ultimately returning to its pre-Enron level”. 
And Knechel and Sharma (2012: 85) argue that despite the fact that “the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX) effectively bars an auditor from providing nonaudit services to an audit client based 
on the belief that the resulting economic bonding undermines the auditor’s independence and 
quality of the audit…there is some merit to the profession’s argument that auditor-provided 
nonaudit services benefit clients without leading to a loss of audit effectiveness”.  
The study by Lander et al. (XXXX; this issue) contributes to this more recent set of studies 
by suggesting that the effectiveness of the governance practices in professional service firms in 
reducing professional-client misconduct depends upon the career stage of the professionals 
employed. More precisely, the authors found that informal behavioural practices are more effective 
 
 
for senior (non-tenured) lawyers, whereas formal outcome-based governance practices are more 
effective for junior lawyers. By providing evidence that ‘one solution does not fit all’, and that the 
effectiveness of firm-level governance practices in preventing misconduct is subordinate to the 
career stage of the professional employed, this study challenges the ‘orthodox’ distinction between 
informal behavioural and formal outcome-based governance practices, as well as the notion that 
the former are more effective than the latter in curbing misconduct (Sharma, 1997). More 
disturbingly perhaps, the study by Radaelli et al. (XXXX; this issue)  shows that the very same 
governance mechanisms that were originally intended to prevent misconduct were actually 
exploited by a mafia clan in its ‘misconduct project’. In particular, the authors document how 
affiliates to the clan and ‘pre-disposed’ professors were able to infiltrate and control the governing 
bodies of the university that should have – at least in theory – been responsible for its internal and 
external accountability and to turn existing systems, practices and procedures which paradoxically 
were intended to maintain the independence and integrity of professionalism as a societal 
institution, to support illegitimate ends. It is the use of these pervasive mechanisms that enabled 
misconduct to go undetected – or, better, unpunished – for over 30 years.  
The papers thus open up the way for future research about how professional organizations, 
regulators, and policy makers should respond to misconduct in more differentiated ways and which 
are not restricted to adaptations to existing regulations and governance regimes. For example, 
future research might investigate under which conditions – and in which contexts – a certain 
regulation or corporate governance regime is more likely to be effective in reducing professional 
misconduct and help design and implement ad hoc regulations and norms that can more effectively 
curb professional misconduct within and by organizations. As Radaelli et al. show, future research 
should be particularly mindful of the danger posed by organizational affordances whereby existing 
 
 
contradictions and ambiguities within certain practices and systems makes them amenable to being 
manipulated to support rather than prevent misconduct. Future research might also be directed 
towards understanding the normative and practical implications of applying different norms and 
regulations to different settings, and who should be responsible for the design, implementation, 
and enforcement of such norms and regulations. It is an open question whether the responsibility 
of regulating professional conduct should reside within the professions themselves or be granted 
externally, and in the latter case to whom.  
 
Conclusions  
In this essay, we argued that research on professions and organizations could benefit from 
a better understanding of professional misconduct, with particular reference to its nature, 
antecedents, implications and consequences. To substantiate our claim, we discussed the most 
important theoretical and empirical insights that emerged from research conducted in this field of 
investigation and showed that, despite the merits of this research, there are still issues that deserve 
closer examination. We have highlighted how papers in this special issue help advance 
understanding of a range of issues. Table 1 outlines the themes and research questions we identified 
along with the contributions of the special issue papers to addressing these questions. We hope 
that future research will further develop understanding of the themes and questions outlined in 
Table 1 and shed new light on professional misconduct, given its theoretical and practical 
relevance.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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Table 1: Key themes and research questions relating to professional misconduct and contributions of special issue papers 
Theme Questions Special issue paper contributions 
The nature of 
professional 
misconduct 
From whose perspective do we define 
professional misconduct? 
Harrington (XXXX; this issue) – professionals redefining misconduct to legitimize their practices 
Roulet et al. (XXXX; this issue) – professionals having a different view to others of what constitutes 
misconduct 
Is professional misconduct only defined 
against formal governance or regulatory 
demands? 
Harrington (XXXX; this issue) – With category distancing, practitioners detach their work from the 
people and purposes it serves, calling attention instead to professionals’ traditional duty to wield 
knowledge impartially. In this way, tax avoidance can be characterized as a form of expertise with no 
inherent moral valence, good or bad 
What represents professional misconduct in 
any specific context? 
Lander et al. (XXXX; this issue) – differences according to careers stage create heterogeneous 
understandings 
Radaelli et al. (XXXX; this issue) – the specificities of misconduct in any particular setting (in their case 
medical education) complicate singular definitions 
The 
antecedents of 
professional 
misconduct 
What factors render social and symbolic 
boundaries more or less important, 
interdependent and effective or ineffective in 
professional misconduct?  
Harrington (XXXX; this issue) and Roulet et al. (XXXX; this issue) – the boundaries between clients 
and professionals are dissolved in ways that encourage misconduct 
 
Are there new symbolic boundaries that 
need to be taken account of and why?  
Lander et al. (XXXX; this issue) – the symbolic boundary between junior and senior professionals affects 
the likelihood of misconduct 
Who do professionals interact with, and how 
do these interactions influence the nature, 
antecedents and consequences of 
professional misconduct? 
Radaelli et al. (XXXX; this issue) – professionals’ interactions crossing boundaries and created new 
interdependencies (with organized crime) that instigate misconduct 
 
How do interactions lead to the 
renegotiation of existing or production of 
new boundaries?  
Roulet et al. (XXXX; this issue) relationships that are too intense renegotiate settlements between 
different groups  
 
 
How do different professionals with 
different relationships experience the same 
boundaries, and what explains this 
differentiation? 
Lander et al. (XXXX; this issue) – junior and senior professionals have different relationships that can 
affect misconduct, and the intensity of relationships between the two groups can determine the likelihood 
of misconduct 
The 
consequences 
and 
implications of 
professional 
misconduct 
Are the consequences of misconduct severe 
for some professionals, whilst others may 
suffer much milder penalties, or even get 
away with their misconduct? 
Roulet et al. (XXXX; this issue) – some professionals gain benefits from misconduct which are more 
significant than any penalties 
 
Are existing corporate governance regimes 
and regulations effective in preventing 
professional misconduct?  
Radaelli et al. (XXXX; this issue) – mafia affiliated and ‘pre-disposed’ professors were able to infiltrate 
and take control of the governing bodies of Troy University. Existing regulations, systems and practices 
were ‘turned’ to help to conceal wrongdoing  
Would stricter, standardized rules and 
regulations alone be effective in curbing 
professional misconduct?  
Lander et al. (XXXX; this issue) – different corporate governance regimes are effective in curbing 
professional misconduct by employees at different stages of their career, and under different 
circumstances 
 
